When
power is seriously contested, it will invariably resort to violence.
That predictable reaction should be taken into account by
contestants. It should be a part of their strategy. Opposing
reactionary violence with violence has seldom been successful, as
power has vast reserves of it. On the other hand, sheer violence is
not an efficient means of control. It may crush opposition, but it
can only bring about a slave-like society of constant turmoil and
general unrest, a price that power has often paid to maintain its
dominion. Martial law has evolved into a police-state quite
frequently. Reactionary violence has been countered by overwhelming
numbers acting in unison. But such mass movements are difficult to
sustain, and usually wear themselves out over time, as less and less
people participate. Armed insurgents need wooded mountains or
tropical forests to move about discretely and hide. They must also
have the moral support of the inhabitants. They are usually the more
radical members of the local community. These groups survive and may
even progress if they have external support and cross-border safe
havens. A few have sparked off nationwide rebellions and changed the
power structures. Some have been exterminated in genocidal killings
and some have lasted decades until a final negotiated conclusion. A
possible obstruction to reactionary violence is the subversion of its
instruments. This is not an easy task, as the military are
brainwashed to obey orders and the police often seem to be a
selection of schoolyard bullies, while both are imbued with the power
of armed force and trained to kill. The uniformed community’s
actions ultimately determine the outcome of opposition to power. They
are the guardians of empire.
Frederick
Engels wrote somewhere that “in a political struggle of class
against class, organisation is the most important weapon” (1). That
remark still holds, but militarism has developed considerably since
then. Two recent examples highlight the importance of the armed
forces in politics. Evo Morales was chased out of Bolivia by the
army, whereas Nicolas Maduro, backed by the army, has held firm in
Venezuela. But then Hugo Chavez was a soldier who knew how the
military functioned and he may have read this article by Paul Sweezy
for the Monthly Review in December 1973, after the overthrow and
death of Salvador Allende in Chile.
“Reactionary
officers should have been retired, loyal ones promoted to key command
positions; the pay, living conditions and democratic rights of
enlisted men and non-commissioned officers should have been expanded
and improved; political education should have been introduced into
training programs; and perhaps most important, all contacts between
the Chilean military and the United States should have been
unconditionally severed. At the same time, the UP administration
should have started organizing, arming, and training a popular
militia with the purpose of entrusting to it more and more of the
responsibilities hitherto borne by the army and the national police
(carabineros).
All of these measures taken together would lead more or less rapidly
to the replacement of the old bourgeois military establishment by a
new one under the control of the socialist forces. When this had been
achieved, the process of transforming Chilean society from capitalism
to socialism could begin in earnest.”
But
what actually happened was that
“The
generals and admirals were handled with kid gloves, and efforts were
made to give them increased economic and political responsibilities.
When the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left) tried to do
political work among the rank-and-file soldiers, the government
cracked down hard: Allende’s own nephew was sent to jail for such
activity. U.S. aid to the military was allowed to continue at a time
when Washington was choking off all credits both by American banks
and by international lending agencies to the government itself. In
the final months before the coup of September 11, 1973, the Allende
administration allowed the congress to pass without veto an act
giving the armed forces the right to search anywhere for arms,
resulting in a veritable reign of terror against workers in their
factories and homes. The military policy of the UP, in short, was not
only to tolerate but to flatter and strengthen an enemy and fifth
column of imperialism in its midst.”
The
organisation of social change must recognise the primacy of defence
and security forces. The upper echelons must adhere to the program,
because their obstructive powers are huge and potentially
destructive.
Karl
Marx joked about Louis Bonaparte obtaining the army’s support with
“cold poultry and garlic sausage” (2). It was not quite that
simple then (1850), and even less so today. There is also a
difference between an army involved in combat operations and one that
is not. France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, NATO, the USA (+?) are
engaged in foreign wars. Their troops are showing signs of severe
battle fatigue, but their plethora of generals just want more of the
same. Any attempt at social change will have to take that situation
into account. A further difference is that which exists between a
conscript army and a professional one. The conscript thinks of going
back to civilian life, the professional thinks of a career. Officers
have been careerists for a long time, going to special schools at a
young age and to military academies, whereas troops were conscripted
until quite recently, when the world’s major armies went
professional. A career soldier’s future promotion depends largely
on obedience, and he is unlikely to adopt social change if not
ordered to. Unfortunately, the support of the military hierarchy
seems to depend on ever increasing funding and sinecures in the
armament industries. All of which contradicts even a very moderate
social-reform regime. In the developed world, class struggle is
hopelessly disorganised and is faced by the overbearing might of
brute force. In fact, the prospects of a more equal and free society
are pretty slim, though COVID-19 may be about to bring trade,
industry and finance crashing down. A global quarantine, a collapse
in demand, except for food being stockpiled by households, and a
general state of emergency would deal out a completely new set of
cards. Triumphant capitalism may be falling off a very high cliff, in
which case it will be extremely difficult to put the pieces together
again. The disruption will be as severe as the climate one, and could
be far more sudden.
2.
“The
Society of December 10 was to remain the private army of Bonaparte
until he succeeded in transforming the public army into a Society of
December 10. Bonaparte made the first attempt at this shortly after
the adjournment of the National Assembly, and precisely with the
money just wrested from it. As a fatalist, he lives in the conviction
that there are certain higher powers which man, and the soldier in
particular, cannot withstand. Among these powers he counts, first and
foremost, cigars and champagne, cold poultry and garlic sausage.
Accordingly, to begin with, he treats officers and non-commissioned
officers in his Elysée apartments to cold poultry and garlic
sausage. On October 3 he repeats this maneuver with the mass of the
troops at the St. Maur review, and on October 10 the same maneuver on
a still larger scale at the Satory army parade. The uncle remembered
the campaigns of Alexander in Asia, the nephew the triumphal marches
of Bacchus in the same land. Alexander was a demigod, to be sure, but
Bacchus was a god and moreover the tutelary deity of the Society of
December 10.”
