The final countdown
Capital and labour share the value produced, and their proportionate shares have varied over time. Capital gets profits, rents and interest. Labour gets salaries, benefits and pensions. The state levies a tax on all this and redistributes it to both capital and labour. Over the past three decades, increased productivity has largely favoured capital, while labour’s share has stagnated. Several factors seem to be behind this shift in wealth distribution.
The
turning was initiated by Thatcher and Reagan, with fewer taxes and
less distribution. The free services provided by governments were
taken over by profit making companies and had to be paid for.
Government disengagement from providing services such as health and
education was not compensated by equivalent rises in salaries, so
households were encouraged to restore their unbalanced finances with
mortgages and overdrafts. Meanwhile, drastically reduced taxes were
forcing governments into increasing debt. All these growing debts
were the result of political decisions that were preceded by an
ideological conversion.
The
1970s marked a trough in the business cycle, with economic
stagnation, high inflation, a crude oil crisis over OPEC price hikes,
the end of the gold standard and America’s withdrawal from Vietnam.
The Eastern Block fared no better. It was the Brezhnev era, when
opponents filled psychiatric institutions instead of Siberian work
camps, where queuing for hours for shoddy goods was part of everyday
life. And Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago was published in 1973, a
terrible indictment of the Soviet regime and its communist model. The
proposed counter-model was small government, low taxes and free
private enterprise. This meant selling publicly owned services,
utilities, land and mines, and subduing the trade unions. Maggie and
Ronald were pretty good at both, and they were followed by the two
champions of Newspeak, Bill and Tony.
Britain
and America initiated the mental turnabout from social to private,
from commonwealth to corporations. In France, a newly elected
“socialist” government was eager to join them. Elsewhere,
adhesion was more hesitant, but after 1991 a new Russia and its
ex-satellites auctioned off everything that could find a buyer. The
nation’s wealth was handed over to some oligarchs who had been
Soviet functionaries or KGB officers. China kept its centralised,
one-party cooptative form of government, while opening up to foreign
investments and joint ventures. And the rest of the world was forced
to conform by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Privatising the public domain brought governments some quickly spent
cash and put an end to revenue. And the privatised need for profits
meant cutting costs, especially the cost of labour. So governments
and households compensated their falling incomes by borrowing.
Revenue had changed hands and was invested in developing countries,
where wages, regulations and taxes were all very advantageous.
Outsourcing production reduced incomes even more and provoked an
equivalent debt bubble.
Capital
and labour are unremittingly linked together, as neither can function
alone. Capital needs labour to produce and consume, while labour
needs capital for the means of production and consumption. Capital
finances and labour does, but only the owners of capital decide what
is financed and what is done. And their ultimate goal is to make a
profit, and thereby increase their capital. This driving force
completely neglects the well-being of societies and of humanity as a
whole. Capital can bring a return in various ways, mainly rent,
entrepreneurial and commercial profits, and interest. It takes
capital to house people and their productive/recreational activities.
It takes capital to make land agriculturally productive. It takes
capital to set up infrastructure for transport, communications,
sewerage and the distribution of water, electricity and gas. It takes
capital to build machines, to extract raw materials, to store and
sell goods, and to supply services. It takes a little capital and a
huge privilege to grant credit, most of which is created out of thin
air as scriptural money.
Housing,
agriculture and infrastructures are long term investments that can,
with appropriate upkeep, last decades if not centuries. Industrial
and commercial investments are more ephemeral, because technology and
fashion are evolutive and unpredictable. Sinking funds are rarely
provisioned for more than ten years, and commonly from two to five
years, which are the life spans of new models. Investments in credit
and debt must cover all these time scales, as well as some of their
own. The period between a loan and its restitution may last hours,
days, months, years, decades and up to a century, with interest
clocking up all along the way. Individual debts can be packaged up as
“derivatives” that can in turn be packaged, and so on. Their
total has been variously estimated at between ten and twenty times
Global World Product (from $700 trillion to $1.5 quadrillion as
compared to $80 trillion) (1). There is no way this astronomical sum
can be redeemed, so the debts roll over and go on increasing every
second of every day.
One
of the strongest arguments against a more egalitarian distribution of
wealth is the promise of growth. Growth like a rising tide lifts all
boats, big and small. Another version is that increased wealth at the
top trickles down to the bottom. What is not said is that, though the
poor benefit from growth, they do so far less than the rich.
Increased wealth for the poor is a rise in wages, whereas increased
wealth for the rich is a rise in capital. Wages may cease but capital
remains and brings a return. Anaemic growth does not directly impact
dividends, but it blocks and reduces salaries. And that in turn
influences demand and eventually profits.
Production
and consumption are two phases of the same process. Productive
investments need willing and able consumers, whereas investments in
debt need borrowers. When the two collude to makes consumers
borrowers and borrowers consumers, labour is reduced to debt bondage
and the concentration of wealth reaches its final stage of global
dominion. However, trying to sustain long term growth in consumer
demand with debt is a fairly obvious fallacy. Debt increases
consumption and is consumed, which means that paying it back reduces
consumption. So debts are rolled over and new ones are contracted to
keep up growth in consumer demand and to pay for interest. Consumer
debt cannot be reduced without a reduction in demand. And, because of
interest, debts must increase just to maintain demand.
Capitalist
accumulation of rent, interest and profits is possible because more
value is taken from the market than is put in. This surplus value is
paid with debts. Invested debts are returned, consumed debts are not.
Consumer debt cannot be paid back without reducing demand. So debts
pile up faster than demand and end up by becoming unmanageable. But
there is no going back other than cancellation (bailing out), and
there is no attenuation other than inflation. Global debt has reached
such a disproportionate dimension that it can no longer grow fast
enough to cover interest and increase consumer demand (2). When
capitalist accumulation slows down globally it can still grow
individually by buying other companies, or by putting them out of
business and taking their market shares. Concentration is the final
stage of accumulation, and it signals the end of the long cycle. It
is a time of extreme tensions and violence, of cut-throat competition
and chauvinistic reactions. And that is a pretty good description of
today’s world. How it will end this time is anybody’s guess.
2.
Until recently, Chinese debt had mostly
been a good thing. China's economy was growing faster than its debt,
making the debt manageable. The growth also meant that there were
positive returns on money loaned out to growing Chinese enterprises.
The
problem with debt, however, is that it lasts a long time. As the debt
pile grows, the repayments become larger and larger, placing a burden
on the economy. Each renminbi of new credit loaned out produces
diminishing results. That prompted Barclay’s analyst Ajay
Rajadhyaksha to call Chinese debt a "bubble" earlier this
year.