Borrowing cycles
The
industrial world has known three severe depressions over the last
century, the 1930s, the 1970s and now the 2010s. A recurrence that
can be traced back farther (1890s, 1850s), but the on-going version
and its two predecessors are well known and will suffice. What is
immediately apparent is their regularity in time. They last ten years
and are separated by thirty, which gives them a periodicity of forty.
For finance and production to go into a tail-spin every four decades,
there must be a mechanism to insure such precision, a mechanical
repetition whose only equivalent, outside of cosmic movements, is the
lending and borrowing of money. All the rest is haphazard and its
chronology is unpredictable.
Credit
must have existed at the origins of value exchange, and debt would
have accompanied the first circulations of legal tender. Both seem
inevitable in a society based on the division of labour and trade,
hence the early importance given to measuring, counting and dating
contracts. Over time, lending money for a precise period became
commonplace and the gamut of durations was standardised from the
short to the long, with the longer ones lasting 10, 20 and 30 years
(rarely more though Disney Corp. was selling 100-year bonds some time
ago). How can these three time scales produce a 40-year cycle of boom
and bust?
A
widespread form of investment is in Treasury bonds and those of major
corporations. A bond is the recognition of a debt, to be restituted
entirely at a certain date and to pay annual interest. T-bonds,
backed by the state treasury, are not legal tender as are bank-notes
but their convertibility is so simple that banks include them in
their reserve funds, alongside bullion and currency, and some
doubtful stuff that comes to light periodically. T-bonds allow
governments to increase their spending without raising taxes and
provide a secure investment for all. However, as governments never
pay back their debts and only renew them at term, the borrowing soon
outstrips the spending. So the function of an economic depression is
to purge the nation’s debts (public and private) by inflation,
closures and other more radical means. And as the state is by far the
major player, its borrowing and purging cycles result in historic
repetitions.
Supposing
the purge has occurred and governments decide to stimulate production
by borrowing and spending, and by cutting taxes. As old debts have
been dissolved, each sum borrowed is a sum spent. So there is growth,
and more tax-revenue pays interest and encourages more tax cuts,
businesses are thriving and with all this flow of money there is even
a perceptible trickledown. Then the first 10-year bonds reach their
terms and must be renewed. And an equal sum must be added to maintain
previous growth in spending. And it is only then that additional
borrowing will increase spending, at a stage where the interest on
the accumulated debt is no longer negligible. For ten years a penny
borrowed was an extra penny spent, and overnight that extra penny
results from the borrowing of three plus the accumulating interest.
Fortunately, the 20-year and 30-year bonds allow some breathing
space, until they also reach their respective terms. The twenty year
term brings a slowdown, and the tipping point is at thirty. Meanwhile
the long term bonds have lost their attraction as secure investments,
and governments have recourse to borrowing at ever shorter terms,
which is reflected in their policies and multiplies that much faster.
Constantly on the verge of budget collapse and default, they slash
spending and survive on a day-to-day basis, with the inevitable
social and political consequences, until something dramatic cancels
the huge pile of debt. In the 1970s double-digit inflation did the
trick, and the time before it was total war as well as inflation. Today’s world is too
big and too complex for such quick solutions, but something will have
to wipe the slate clean and give governments back the power of
initiative over revenue and spending. If not, representative
political systems become meaningless.
The
Kippur attack in 1973 resulted in an oil embargo decreed by Arab
exporters, followed by a general price rise decided by OPEC. Oil was
paid in US dollars whose gold convertibility was a thing of the past,
so inflation was a natural recourse. It was also explained to OPEC
members that their dollars might buy things in Europe but would only
buy Treasury bonds in the US. A new price hike in 1979 produced
another inflation peak, and that was the end of it, the stage was
cleared for Reaganomics to take over. The new cycle had the dollar
standing alone without gold backing. It also had the tool,
inaugurated by the Nixon administration, of selling long T-bonds
abroad to balance trade deficits. The dollar was irresistible and
borrowing was global, with everyone holding some of everybody’s
debts, world liabilities in dollars (sterling, euro and yen are in
the same situation) that went far, far beyond the petro-dollar
question of forty years ago. In the 1970s, apart from the oil market,
the dollar was still the national currency of the United States, and
was being used essentially inside the Union. However, the dollar’s
expansion during the present cycle has been such that transactions in
dollars occurring outside the US outweigh those occurring inside,
which means that it is no longer a national currency but a sort of
“dollar-zone”, and that inflationary measures are no longer a
national option. And the only alternative is a continual reduction in
spending, contracting markets and a long recession with no apparent
exit. The world is facing a monetary meltdown and the destruction of
financial and industrial assets on an unimaginable scale. When
borrowing cycles are concerned, the harder they come the harder they
fall, one and all.