Where have the flowers gone?
Choosing
the head of a nation’s executive by universal suffrage gives
legitimacy but does not necessarily give power. Franklin Roosevelt is
reported to have complained to Churchill of how little power he had,
compared to that of an English prime minister who is leader of the
parliamentary majority. However, in Russia, the elected president
seems all-powerful when he is called Putine, and must defer to his
prime minister when he is called Medvedev, which confirms the local
tradition of personalised power and turns the electoral process into
a farce. In France, the president names his prime minister and can
define the actions and decisions of government if his party controls
the National Assembly. That has not always been the case. And, in
many countries, presidents are re-elected continuously and wield the
absolute dominion of corruption and force.
The
United States are a federation of quasi nations that have their own
governments, legislations, particularities and priorities, a
patchwork of differences that adapts badly to the bipolar politics in
Washington. The president is a party candidate whose election splits
the federation into red and blue. But the unanimous party support
fades as soon as he begins to legislate. Being elected is one thing
and governing is another. The first needs charisma, skills in debate
and oration, and spectacular financial backing. The second is a
continuous tussle with senate and congress. FDR appealed directly to
the people in “fireside chats” on national radio, and shaped
opinion to influence the nation’s representatives, LBJ was more
adept at arm twisting behind the scenes, and some presidents have
been perfect candidates and useless at governing.
The
provinces are more conservative than the metropolis. In the US, this
means that the urban conglomerates of the North East and South West
are more progressive than the rest. New York and Los Angeles are
America’s ideological beacons shining on the world, but they
represent only themselves. They probably have less influence on ideas
inside the Union than they have globally. Their liberal, liberated
and multicultural ideals are not shared unanimously by the America in
between. Provincials are proud of their difference, tend to be
xenophobic and envious of the capital, and prefer central subsidies
to cultural and legislative interference. This reflects the ancient
opposition between the countryside and the towns that drain wealth
and power into the hands of merchants and princes. Wall Street, the
White House and Hollywood hold the nation’s reins, but the nation’s
support has to be won piecemeal.
Two
parties have dominated American politics since the beginning of the
Union, when Jefferson’s Republican party opposed the Federalists
behind Washington and Hamilton. Then the two sides changed names and
programmes in a somewhat confusing manner. The Jeffersonian distrust
of centralised executive power was taken up by the Democratic party
founded by Andrew Jackson in 1830. And the importance of a unified
government, currency and destiny promoted by Hamilton and Adams was
the foundation of the new Republican Party that brought Lincoln to
the presidency. It all turned around again when the Democrat Franklin
Roosevelt expanded government to vast dimensions during the
Depression and the war, and obliged the Republicans to adopt the
contrary attitude, which had been the programme of the original
label. Back to their roots, the Republicans are provincials and
Democrats are metropolitans, so that a Democratic candidate may have
the advantage for the elections but a Republican president will
govern more easily. Hopeless Dubya seemed to do what he wanted, in
fact he was just in tune with the Congressional Majority, whereas the
clever and suave negotiator BO has had to back down repeatedly
because he was playing a different melody.
With
regards to social legislation, Lyndon Johnson was arguably the most
liberal, not to say socialist, of American presidents (his imperial
foreign policies are another matter). Civil and voting rights,
immigration, education, stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, gun control, the
list is impressive and could go on. This big ugly Texan was born into
politics and was involved at the age of twenty-two in campaigning for
Democratic Senator Hopkins. Johnson was elected to the House in 1937
and, after a very shady primary, to the Senate in 1948. Elections
were not his forte, where he excelled was in political wrangling.
Historians
Caro and Dallek consider Lyndon Johnson the most effective Senate
majority leader in history. He was unusually proficient at gathering
information. One biographer suggests he was "the greatest
intelligence gatherer Washington has ever known", discovering
exactly where every Senator stood, his philosophy and prejudices, his
strengths and weaknesses, and what it took to break him. Robert Baker
claimed that Johnson would occasionally send senators on NATO trips
in order to avoid their dissenting votes. Central to Johnson's
control was "The Treatment", described by two journalists:
The
Treatment could last ten minutes or four hours. It came, enveloping
its target, at the Johnson Ranch swimming pool, in one of Johnson's
offices, in the Senate cloakroom, on the floor of the Senate itself —
wherever Johnson might find a fellow Senator within his reach.
Its
tone could be supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn,
tears, complaint and the hint of threat. It was all of these
together. It ran the gamut of human emotions. Its velocity was
breathtaking, and it was all in one direction. Interjections from the
target were rare. Johnson anticipated them before they could be
spoken. He moved in close, his face a scant millimeter from his
target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his eyebrows rising and
falling. From his pockets poured clippings, memos, statistics.
Mimicry, humor, and the genius of analogy made The Treatment an
almost hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and
helpless. (Wikipedia)
Successive
presidents relied on Johnson, particularly for his knowledge of, and
influence on, the Southern Democrats, a very reactionary group who
felt nostalgia for pre-Civil War times. Having easily eliminated him
at the 1960 Convention, Kennedy took him as vice-president for the
same reasons. Once elected, however, Johnson lost his leadership of
the Senate Majority and found himself in a sort of limbo, which
lasted until that fatal afternoon in Dallas when a sniper’s bullet
put him in the driving seat, a place he might never have occupied
otherwise. The next five years saw a torrent of legislative change
and, in 1968 when city ghettos were rioting everywhere after the
assassination of Martin Luther King in Memphis, Johnson commented to
his press secretary, “What did you expect? I don’t know why we're
so surprised. When you put your foot on a man's neck and hold him
down for three hundred years, and then you let him up, what's he
going to do? He's going to knock your block off" (Ibid). Tired
and worn, in poor health and bogged down in Vietnam (Hey, hey, LBJ,
how many kids did you kill to-day?), he did not run for a second
term, and is said to have preferred Nixon to Humphrey.
Interestingly
– could it be mere coincidence? – during the last century
war-time presidents were all Democrats, Woodrow Wilson for WW1,
Franklin Roosevelt for WW2, Harry Truman in Korea and Kennedy/Johnson
in Vietnam. (This suggests that Obama is following tradition in
Afghanistan, the difference is that he is fighting a Republican
conflict with a professional army). Is there a link between
Democratic governments and the American Nation’s acceptance of the
trials of war? Or does the situation that precedes actual combat
favour Democratic candidates? Wilson was a Virginian who moved North
to where the power was. His vision of big centralised government made
him the architect of Roosevelt’s New Deal, with whom he shared a
penchant for certain aspects of the British Parliament. He criticised
the checks and balances of American politics and “a federal system
that parcels out power and confuses responsibility” (Ibid).
The
importance of centralised control when making war had already been
recognised by the Roman Republic, where a dictator would hold the
imperium for the duration of the conflict. But perpetual war
led to the absolute power of emperors, who were the tools and the
promoters of military expansion. Wilson used war to crush the labour
movement, by mass arrests, deportations and long jail sentences for
IWW members and militant anarchists. Congress voted the Espionage Act
that made criticism of the war a criminal offence, and this abuse of
the First Amendment was upheld by the Supreme Court. Wilson’s
election had been an alternative in a time of deep social unrest, and
he was seen by Big Business as a possible solution. The time was ripe
for a new relationship between capital, state and labour. Or, as US
Steel’s Frank Munsey wrote to Theodor Roosevelt, the state should
have a “paternal attitude towards the people” who needed its
“support and help” (Howard Zinn). The strategy implemented by
Wilson was the usual carrot and stick. His first mandate saw the
creation of the Federal Reserve, a reduction of custom-duties,
anti-trust legislation and federal loans to farmers. He failed to put
a stop to child labour but succeeded in imposing an 8-hour workday.
The social unrest did not abate however, and the ardent pacifist of
1916 became a re-elected warmonger in 1917 (after a warm up of
gunboat diplomacy and the bombing of Veracruz). There were various
avowed and secret reasons for sending troops to Europe, but a large
majority of Americans were against involvement, which explains
Wilson’s sudden post-election turn around. It was the foundation of
the militarised economy denounced by Eisenhower decades later. In
1912 Wilson had seemed favourable to minorities, and the
Afro-American community had largely abandoned the Republicans
(Lincoln’s party) to vote for him. But they were fooled, the way
the pacifists were to be in 1916, as Wilson turned out to be a
convinced segregationist who extended the policy to all federal
departments.
Social
equality is contrary to the separation of capital and labour. But
capital needs labour to work and consume, and must constantly
maintain the pretence of a common interest and destiny. In times of
expansion, emulation is the unifying force. In times of regression,
the enemies without and within create the bond. Hence the ideological
pendulum that swings back and forth at the rhythm of economic cycles.
The libertarian and individualistic program works well when there is
innovation and growth, or territorial extensions. Fortunes are there
to be made, and those who fail have only themselves to blame. The
self-made (sic) billionaire is the living proof that anyone can be
wealthy, and anyone is everyone. The filthy rich are the model, and
nothing is allowed to hamper their ascension. When the cycle turns
down and the social escalator stops, this ideological construct
cannot function anymore and capital has to apply plan B. The
conversion to austerity and patriotism is not easy, and the call to
arms is an attractive path. Like the Roman god Janus, capital has two
faces, the broad smile of growth and the stern expression of
recession. And the change of countenance needs to be explained and
justified. Capitalism cannot blame itself, so some scape-goats have
to be found. Rogue bankers, global speculators and feral traders are
thrown to the mob (in the past these professions often had ethnic
connotations). But, as the cyclical recession deepens and the first
sacrificial victims are expended, the next step is to put the
nation’s youth in uniform and send them off to war. An external
danger is designated along with its fifth-column, and the nation in
peril tightens its ranks.
Elected
parliaments are supposed to represent the whole gamut of society. But
the fundamental division between capital and labour affects the
representation and facilitates a two party system. They will be
seated to the right or the left of the speaker’s stand, one will be
more conservative and the other more liberal, and they will pretend
to be the depositaries of Roman or Athenian ideals. They will seem
different in opposition and very similar when they hold power. A left
liberal democrat minority will support labour, and a right
conservative republican minority will support capital. But, as
majorities, both will sustain the status quo by whatever means, both
will buttress the duality of society and of politics, a divide that
determines their existence and gives sense to their lives. The
duality of politics reflects that of society, whereas the wielding of
power is subjected to the consecutive phases of economic cycles. The
strife and uncertainty provoked by the down-turn favour centralised
administration and government intervention, a tentacular state that
tries to maintain the crumbling blocks of private capitalism, with
funds and ever more repressive authoritarian policies. The candidate
who advocates this process, whatever the populist trimmings he
decorates it with, has the best chance of obtaining a majority. In
the present circumstances Democrats have the advantage.