Too big to grow
When
the means of production, starting with land, become the property of a
minority, there arises the question of controlling the propertyless
majority. This “social control” (Allen) is basically brute force,
justified by legislation that favours and protects private property.
But, being so few, the owning class needs an intermediary mercenary
group to apply the forceful control and enact the rules. It must
employ soldiers and clerks. This necessity produces a three tiers
society, a labouring majority, the armed forces and the ideologues,
and the propertied rulers. The ruling class relies on the middle
class for its dominion and ideas. This dangerous dependency is
resolved by division. Clerk and soldier are kept in conflictive
tension, where it is uncertain whether the pen commands the sword or
the other way round.
Property
subjects labour with guns and gods, with might and mystification
(Engels adds misogyny), and it masters these instruments by
constantly shifting dominion from one to the other. A pendulous
movement that follows the ups and downs of the power struggle with
labour. When labour is strong, property has recourse to unheld
promises and revocable concessions. Its speakers offer the sky. When
labour is weak, force suffices. But propertyless labour’s only
possible strength is unity, and property’s major task is to disrupt
all unifying endeavours. Ruling is dividing. The original split
between have and have-not perpetuates itself by provoking chaos, by
pitting all against all in perpetual conflict.
Private
property, with its unavoidable accumulation, makes social cohesion
impossible and acerbates conflicts to maintain its empire. A constant
goading that regularly leads to bloodshed. Either the military fights
labour or labour is pressed into fighting itself, in the name of
national property, for a mother/father land it will never inherit.
The pressure exerted by private property (rent, usury and dividend)
and its divisive tactics provoke turmoil of varying intensity, which
is probably linked to the trickle-down flows of wages and credit.
When technology increases productivity and the value produced,
property and labour receive their usual disproportions, and both of
them are growing. Once the new technology is in place, the extra
gains in productivity become marginal and the value produced
stabilises. But property and labour are eager for more, whipped on by
futuristic dreams and emulation. So property takes more by reducing
wages and social benefits and, to avoid a social breakdown, it grants
huge amounts of credit to labour and government.
Supposing
that property is not completely mindless, the accumulation of debt to
allow the continued accumulation of capital could only be a temporary
solution. It offered a way to tide over until the next technological
jump and a new growth cycle. The trouble is that speed and size, the
two motors of productivity, have material and economic limits.
Information is transmitted at the absolute speed of light, and though
trains, trucks, ships and planes could still get bigger and faster,
they all seem to have reached or passed their maximum cost
effectiveness, as have big factories and high-rise buildings. If
productivity is in its ultimate stage, the future growth that is
supposed to resolve the debt crisis will not materialise.
Unfortunately, the savagery of capitalist accumulation is only
attenuated by a general increase in the value produced. In the past,
property has shown its rapacious ferocity with every global
recession, but each time technology was able to set off a new growth
cycle with bigger and faster production. But, beyond the extremes of
size and speed, this form of salvaging is no longer possible.
Private
property was founded by violence and has shown no qualms about its
continued use. Property’s last stand will be a messy affaire that
might be attenuated if its demise is accepted as an unavoidable
outcome. So far there are no signs of such a change of outlook, with
crowds of ideologues waffling on about 2050, 2100 and beyond,
projecting yesterday’s expansion into the distant future as a
fundamental article of faith. Turning that round before everything
goes haywire is at best an unlikely probability.
Theodore
Allen. The Invention of the White Race (1994)
Friedrich
Engels. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State
(1884)
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