The egalitarian ideal.
Twenty years ago the Iron Curtain was breached in Germany, signalling the beginning of the end of the Cold War. That this should happen where it did is not surprising, as that was where the confrontation between East and West was at its most acute. Elsewhere the Curtain followed national boundaries, only in Germany did it split a nation in two. Only there did each side see a distorted mirror image if itself. There was no national difference, only a systemic one. Though East and West Germans shared a seat at the United Nations, they were opposed by the global conflict. The contradiction was extreme.
From the outset, the Soviet regime had professed an egalitarian ideal. No more national and religious distinctions, the Soviet citizen had identical rights and duties from the Bering Straits to the Baltic Sea. This was not an easy task, as many nations in the old Tsarist Empire did not consider themselves Russian, let alone Soviet. The egalitarian ideal had too root out all differences, so populations were moved around, places of worship closed, and opponents from everywhere were herded into the Arctic gulag. The West did not have to deal with egalitarianism. The colonial powers had never accepted their subject peoples as equals. Granting them independence merely replaced the colonial administration with a native government. And these governments remained wholly dependant, both financially and militarily, on the neo-colonial metropolis. This meant that the three continents could be plundered at will, their populations could live in abject poverty, and their rulers could act as absolute tyrants, while Western Europeans and North Americans enriched themselves without the slightest qualm, in the benevolent framework of their liberal societies.
For forty years Germans lived astride the global ideological divide. At the start, the Easterners were looted by their Soviet occupiers and obliged to pay war damages. Then, after the uprisings of 1953 (and the death of Stalin), they were gradually blended into the Soviet norm. The Westerners were more fortunate. They were the main beneficiaries of the Marshall plan and, untroubled by the colonial problems of their neighbours, were soon the most prosperous nation in Europe. Wealth instead of drudgery, shiny colours instead of dismal grey, BMWs instead of Trabants, who could resist such attractions? The good life was in the West, where even immigrants seemed to fare better than Easterners. So that by the late 1980s a vast majority of East Germans were striving to go west. And, at the first signs of weakness shown by a wavering authority, they crossed the line en masse and brought down the wall.
The egalitarian ideal has proved to be unfeasible. It cannot compete with the ostentation of inequality. It cannot produce the lavish spectacle of mega-wealth. The luxury celebrities who fuel the popular day-dreams are far too potent to be countered by a communal ethic. And life as a lottery is a much simpler and more appealing fantasy than the prosaic struggle for a common good. However, the unequal distribution of income is not just a glamour show. It tends to favour investment rather than consumption, and thereby the accumulation of public and private debts, a financial house of cards that periodically collapses. These times of crisis are when demagogues call for a level society, when a disgruntled middle class burns its idols and follows the first determined leader to present himself. The world has often been in crisis before, but the usual outlet of war and the levelling effects it induces are no longer a serious option. So the sharing of dwindling resources in a changing climate could turn out to be a necessity rather than an ideal.
From the outset, the Soviet regime had professed an egalitarian ideal. No more national and religious distinctions, the Soviet citizen had identical rights and duties from the Bering Straits to the Baltic Sea. This was not an easy task, as many nations in the old Tsarist Empire did not consider themselves Russian, let alone Soviet. The egalitarian ideal had too root out all differences, so populations were moved around, places of worship closed, and opponents from everywhere were herded into the Arctic gulag. The West did not have to deal with egalitarianism. The colonial powers had never accepted their subject peoples as equals. Granting them independence merely replaced the colonial administration with a native government. And these governments remained wholly dependant, both financially and militarily, on the neo-colonial metropolis. This meant that the three continents could be plundered at will, their populations could live in abject poverty, and their rulers could act as absolute tyrants, while Western Europeans and North Americans enriched themselves without the slightest qualm, in the benevolent framework of their liberal societies.
For forty years Germans lived astride the global ideological divide. At the start, the Easterners were looted by their Soviet occupiers and obliged to pay war damages. Then, after the uprisings of 1953 (and the death of Stalin), they were gradually blended into the Soviet norm. The Westerners were more fortunate. They were the main beneficiaries of the Marshall plan and, untroubled by the colonial problems of their neighbours, were soon the most prosperous nation in Europe. Wealth instead of drudgery, shiny colours instead of dismal grey, BMWs instead of Trabants, who could resist such attractions? The good life was in the West, where even immigrants seemed to fare better than Easterners. So that by the late 1980s a vast majority of East Germans were striving to go west. And, at the first signs of weakness shown by a wavering authority, they crossed the line en masse and brought down the wall.
The egalitarian ideal has proved to be unfeasible. It cannot compete with the ostentation of inequality. It cannot produce the lavish spectacle of mega-wealth. The luxury celebrities who fuel the popular day-dreams are far too potent to be countered by a communal ethic. And life as a lottery is a much simpler and more appealing fantasy than the prosaic struggle for a common good. However, the unequal distribution of income is not just a glamour show. It tends to favour investment rather than consumption, and thereby the accumulation of public and private debts, a financial house of cards that periodically collapses. These times of crisis are when demagogues call for a level society, when a disgruntled middle class burns its idols and follows the first determined leader to present himself. The world has often been in crisis before, but the usual outlet of war and the levelling effects it induces are no longer a serious option. So the sharing of dwindling resources in a changing climate could turn out to be a necessity rather than an ideal.
posted by le Lézard at 7:42 AM
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